Being at the Gate: The External Dimension of European Crisis Management at the Final RESPOND Conference
Panel: 21. November 2020, 10:30–12:00 CET
by Nadine Livaditi, Ilias Aggelos | University of the Aegean
Panel Abstract
The panel brought together RESPOND team members from five countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Greece, Italy, Poland) who discussed respective findings and developments regarding legislation, policy measures and practices on border management and refugee protection, and, most importantly, their implementation on each country’s legislation. Although some countries, such as Turkey (open-doors policy) and Lebanon, seemed to be relatively more welcoming at the beginning of the Syrian displacement in 2011, restricted access to national/federal territories, additional physical measures, such as security walls and push backs, have gradually become common, hindering the asylum procedure, particularly after 2015. As of 2015, almost all the above countries have faced pressure and a lack of administrative capacity to process the increasing number of arrivals on their territories. As such, many of them introduced legislative reforms and restrictive policies in terms of border management and asylum procedures. The restrictive policies aimed also at increasing the number of deportations and returns. Despite the largely shared regional, international and supranational obligations regarding refugee protection, the overarching pattern in the field of refugee protection is characterized by a restrictive approach. The panelists noted as well the implications of the strong external dimension of the crisis management on border and protection policies as well as the role of different national and European agencies (FRONTEX, EASO, etc.) and their political tendencies characterizing the new post-2015 borderscape and asylum regime. Last but not least some of the panelists referred to the New Pact on Migration and Asylum and raised serious concerns regarding the protection risks of the proposed EU policy measures.
Participants
• N. Ela Gokalp Aras (TR)
• Fatima Ibrahim (LEB)
• Eva Papatzani (GR)
• Lena Karamanidou (UK)
• Veronica Federico (IT)
• Monika Szulecka (PL)
• Sabine Hess (DE; MOD)
• Bernd Kasparek (DE; MOD)
Turkey | Dr. N. Ela Gokalp Aras
At the beginning of the Syrian displacement in 2011, Turkey seemed to follow a more open door policy that gradually changed into a more restrictive one with a EU orientation. The EU and its attempts to control migration through externalization as well as Turkey’s national security concerns, which increased with the advent of mass migration from the Middle East, have always been important driving forces for shaping the migration and asylum policy and the Syrian mass migration. Conducted research shows that Turkey's responses changed through the years. Starting from 2011 until mid-2012, an open-door policy with a humanitarian and flexible approach was adopted by an assertive foreign policy. The second phase of the refugee response started in late 2012 and ended around mid-2015 when Turkey began to look to regional and international initiatives (UN), as solutions. By mid-2015, started a EU-orientation with a de-facto closed-door policy. Alongside, by 2015 up until now are performed cross-border operations, the construction of the “security walls” at Turkey-Syria and Turkey-Iran borders and the Syrian part became completely equipped with advanced technological surveillance tools, mobile border towers etc. In the summer of 2016, the political context of Turkey changed dramatically and a “state of emergency” that lasted until July 18th of 2018 was declared. After the attempt to overthrow the government in 2016 and due to national security concerns that is to prevent irregular escapes from the country Turkey tightened its border controls. In the light of Turkey's approach to return and following the Turkey-Greece border development in 2020, a new period was observed starting from 2019. This phase is based on broad return narratives and ad-hoc practices and techniques to promote ‘voluntary’ returns.
New Pact on Migration and Asylum
The New Pact will enhance the cooperation with third countries in order to facilitate return and readmission, as part of deepening migration partnerships, including by mobilizing other policies, tools and instruments. In these partnerships the EU needs to balance its objectives on migration management with other aspects of mutual interest, in a tailor-made approach. To do so, the EU should mobilize all its relevant policies, tools and instruments to enhance cooperation on readmission. The Pact intends to sustain EU-Turkey partnership with same old political incentives, and not with new responsibility sharing or challenging to the root causes. Lastly, the Pact will function both as being justified by and also promoting securitization in the Mediterranean, and other regions too, where the source countries are, without generating meaningful change but by creating more violation of the fundamental rights of migrants and refugees.
Lebanon | Fatima Ibrahim Project Manager at Refugees=Partners
The outbreak of the Syrian conflict has adversely affected Lebanon in several ways. The closure of trade routes between Syria and Lebanon, the regional destabilization and deterioration in security has led to a sizable pressure on the Lebanese economy that has intensified the political polarization and gridlock. Even though the Lebanese government initially maintained an open border policy with Syria between 2011 and 2014, the escalation of the Syrian conflict and the subsequent influx of Syrian refugees to Lebanon, have led the Lebanese government to adopt a more austere approach to Syrian refugees by invoking stricter entry restrictions and harsh legal residency requirements.
Prior to 2014, Lebanon’s approach to refugees had been one of “disassociation”, where the GoL would officially refer to Syrian refugees fleeing conflict as displaced persons (nazihoun) instead of refugees (lajioun). This approach was later manifested in an anti-refugee policy that first sought to reduce the number of Syrians entering Lebanon in 2014. The same year a comprehensive policy on Syrian displacement was adopted, with the explicit goal of decreasing the number of Syrians in Lebanon by reducing access to territory and encouraging returns to Syria. Later in 2017 and 2018, the President of Lebanon, officially requested assistance from the international community to establish “safe zones” in Syria for refugees to return to and tasked the General Security Directorate with contacting the Syrian regime and to follow up on refugee returns to Syria.
The GoL’s approach to the influx of Syrian refugees since the beginning and more aggressively after 2015 has been one of dissociation, non-integration, and non-adherence to national and international law as well as regional agreements, and has had a detrimental impact on the livelihoods and living conditions of an already vulnerable population.
Greece - Eastern Aegean Islands | PhD(c) Eva Papatzani
Greece has undergone significant developments in its national asylum procedures as well as in border management during the last decade. In 2015, the country experienced large refugee movements especially through the sea borders of the Eastern Aegean islands. In 2016, following the closure of the so-called Western Balkans Corridor and the EU-Turkey Statement, Greece adopted a new law (4375/2016) that introduced crucial changes in the legal framework, first reception and asylum procedures as well as the management of refugee flows. As a result of the EU-Turkey Statement and the aforementioned Law, any persons arriving at the five Northeastern Aegean islands (Lesvos, Samos, Chios, Kos and Leros), where the Hot Spot areas operate, were obliged in a geographical restriction within the territory of the island of first reception and subjected to possible deportation to Turkey after a Fast-Track Border Asylum Procedure. Today, the geographical restriction of movement is lifted only in three cases. When a person is granted international protection, is considered vulnerable, or can make use of the family provisions of the Dublin Regulation. However, asylum seekers who have already been recognized as ‘vulnerable’ very often remain in the Hot Spot sites for months or a year, despite the lifting of the geographical restriction on their cases due to the serious lack in the identification of empty spaces in mainland’s accommodation facilities. Moreover, serious concerns regarding the first registration procedure were reported, such as delays on the medical screening and vulnerability assessment, lack of proper interpretation, lack of information of the asylum applicants on the outcome of the procedure, understaffing of services, the persistence of systematic failures in the conduct of interviews by EASO officials and the reception conditions in the Hot Spot areas of the country. Lastly, the Hotspot regime seems to expand border zones in the territory of the nation-state, by creating buffer zones in Greece that function as multiple filtering mechanisms, not only concerning the movement inside or outside it, but also the movement towards the EU.
New Pact on Migration and Asylum
Based on the presentations findings it seems that the Pact codifies and regularizes the failed EU Hotspot approach, which has caused prolonged mass confinement of people in inhuman conditions at points of entry such as the Greek islands.
The “pre-entry screening” process that is proposed in the Pact for all people who arrive at EU borders irregularly (including security, health and vulnerability checks, and registration of biometric data) seems to systematize first registration practices that already take place in the Hotspots since 2016.
The Fast track border procedure that refers to applicants who are nationals of a third country with recognition rates lower than 20%, is also similar to the mechanisms and practices that determine (in)admissibility of asylum applications, inspired by the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. Until today, new arrivals are detained inside the Hotspots during the (in)admissibility procedures. Through the New Pact the extension of detention during the border procedures is clear, especially because the screening and asylum procedures are interrelated with return policies.
The fast track procedures for the asylum examination that both the EU and the new Greek Law aspire have been proved impossible unless the right to asylum or other procedural guarantees are respected.
As the Pact mentions, Moria Hotspot in Lesvos Island will be reconstructed and will operate as a joint European pilot project. What does this mean? In the New Pact is currently outlined an extension of EASO competences and a further Europeanization of the Asylum procedures while serious concerns have been expressed regarding the systematic failures of EASO to guarantee procedural security, transparency and accountability within its operation. Lastly, the suggestion that people undergoing border procedures are not considered to have formally entered the territory of the Member State deepens what is described as the function of Greece, and especially Greek islands, as a border and asylum buffer zone for the EU.
Greece - Evros Region | Dr. Lena Karamanidou
Evros, the northeastern area of Greece that forms the only land border with Turkey, most of which is constituted by the river Evros is one of the most important border sites in Europe. Pushbacks in Evros region are not fake news. They have been conducted across the Greek-Turkish land border for over a decade. They have been documented in hundreds of testimonies collected by NGOs and activists which refer to Greek police and military, as well as masked men without uniforms and describe criminal practices such as beatings and assaults, confiscation and destruction of papers and personal belongings – especially mobile phones in order to prevent recording. A new pattern emerged this year – migrants are recruited into conducting the last stage of pushbacks, the crossing into Turkey. At the same time, it is extremely difficult to have any visual evidence of pushbacks in Evros. There are no activists or journalists present on the ground, few NGOs, and the locations where pushbacks happen are within a military zone where access is forbidden. Greek authorities have consistently denied that pushbacks take place and failed at investigating them and the serious human right violations they entail. Frontex, which has been present since 2010, and is obliged to comply with the human rights law in all its operations and activities, fails repeatedly to fulfill the fundamental rights obligations or be accountable to either internal or external actors. Furthermore, the reported violation cases that often occurred, are not investigated thoroughly, neither by national authorities nor by Frontex. Also, since 2014, many testimonies refering to pushbacks done by Frontex officers have been recorded by at least 4 different NGO’s, but it is not always possible to determine beyond doubt whether they are indeed Frontex officers,. In February 2019 and March 2020, the Fundamental Rights Officer, after visiting Evros, suggested the suspension of operations and recommended strengthening fundamental rights safeguards in the operational plan, which were never adopted.
Italy | Assoc. Pr. Veronica Federico
Italy reorganized its national asylum system according to the EU Directives (2013/33/EU and 2013/32/EU) in 2015. As for the implementation of the Hot Spot approach by the end of 2018, four Hotspots were operating in Apulia (Taranto) and Sicily (Lampedusa, Pozzallo, and Messina), down from five in 2017. Since its introduction, the Hot Spot approach has proved very effective for the purpose that it has been proposed, especially regarding the identification of the newly arrived persons on Italian shores, which is a crucial element of the Dublin regulation allowing for the clear definition of the First entry member state. However, based on respective findings from the conducted research, the respect for fundamental rights and asylum seekers dignity, as well as for the rule of law and the principle of fair trial have remained very, very critical. Furthermore, it is reported that asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection suffer serious violations of their fundamental rights and experience poor living conditions, lack of support and clear information about the asylum regulations in the Hot Spots. Italy is a natural bridge extended in the Mediterranean Sea, and in the past years the Italian government and the EU have tried to transform this bridge into a gate pursuing two strategies:
1-strengthening of the borders together with a physical and legal narrowing of the access to Italy and Europe such as narrowing of legal entry channels, criminalization of migrants, push backs at the sea as well as criminalization of non-governmental search and rescue operations that have increased in 2018-19 with the "closed ports" policy of Salvini’s government.
2-building up an "outpost-line" in Southern Mediterranean countries through a number of agreements with those countries, regardless of the nature of their governments and the respect of fundamental rights.
In line with the common tendency among EU members to limit rights, the controversial so-called "Salvini’s Decree Law No. 113/2018" turned into Law 132/2018 and abolished the humanitarian protection regime in 2018. Also, new regulations have broadened the range of criminal offenses that justify the revocation of international protection and introduce measures to reduce new arrivals and contain irregular immigration (Ibrido and Terlizzi, 2019, p.20). Thus, the Italian Asylum system is defined as “prolonged and generalized legal uncertainty concerning the protection of refugees” (Ibrido and Terlizzi, 2019, p.32).
Poland | Monika Szulecka
While Mediterranean countries of the EU seem to face common issues regarding large waves of asylum seekers at their borders, Poland seems to be in a slightly different situation. Poland has been a major route to the EU long before becoming a country member. In the 1990s it served as a transit country to central and northern Europe for people migrating from the former USSR countries and central and North Asia. As for today, Poland has not been affected by the migration and refugee crisis of 2015 the way southern and southeastern countries did, so, consequently, the overall administration of asylum applications submitted in Poland did not change. The, so far, debate on how to deal with forced migrants changed completely and, like in other EU countries, there have been introduced restrictions to the access to national territory along as well as to the asylum procedure, with the introduction of new physical and procedural barriers. In a few words, they choose to leave the door wide open for economic migrants and workers (especially short-term) and closed for asylum seekers. Polish government eagerly referred to millions of Ukrainians accepted on the territory of Poland as a sufficient contribution, justifying refusal to accept “culturally distant” asylum seekers who arrived to Southern Europe. Since 2015, the debate about possible solutions to the ‘refugee crisis’ brought reforms to both international protection and immigration law. In 2019, a revised proposal for amending the Law on Protection has been imported, that includes a border procedure, a further update of the list of safe countries of origin and safe third countries and possibility for detention for asylum applicants while pending their RSD procedures. All these proposed changes in law are discouraging and most probably directed to an internal state security and there are concerns about unofficial practices such as pushbacks on the eastern border between Poland and Belarus, as well as blocking the asylum applications, as pointed-out by interviews with NGO’s.
New Pact on Migration and Asylum
The New Pact seems closer (than the previous proposals) to the idea Polish government, accompanied by other governments from CEE countries, has a response to higher migration pressure. It drives attention to external borders and effective returns, something that Poland was postulating and was focusing on. The focus on border procedures included in the New Pact may reinforce the legislative process of introducing the border procedure, together with the lists of safe third countries and safe countries of origin. Moreover, the New Pact brings the risk of migration policy being more aimed at externalization of migration policy, deterrence and returns. The last two goals of migration policy seem the main objective of migration control in recent years in Poland – detention applied to secure the execution of return orders and presented as the factor contributing to high effectiveness (more than 90% of effective returns) of return policy in Poland is an illustration. The fact is, however, that the high effectiveness of return policy is created to a large extent by Ukrainian citizens returning to Ukraine (neighboring Poland) after overstaying their visas or breaching the conditions of stay. Return decisions are issued to them already at the border, when they are on the way to go to their home country, voluntarily. Last but not least, the concept of flexible solidarity included in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum assumes the following option: relocation, sponsoring returns in case of lack of consent to relocation, and if this return is not effective in 8 months, relocating the migrant, or – the third option – other financial or operational contribution. Polish stance is clear: NO to relocation – this is presented by the government and the reelected president as something on which Poland can never agree, since it may mean cultural or social experiment (minister of interior) or necessity to detain foreigners who were forcefully relocated to Poland in case their return is impossible (according to reelected president). Indeed, pre-removal detention is the main factor associated in Poland with relatively high effectiveness of return policy.