Securitisation of Border Policy in Lebanon and its Impact on Refugees
Lebanon/Syria/Israel border by Joshuapiano
By Alli Divine, Johanna-Maria Huelzer | Lebanon Support
Lebanon’s borders are simultaneously porous, largely un-demarcated, and heavily militarised. Lebanon’s border with Syria, mapped by the French mandate, was never fully formalised before the colonial withdrawal in 1943. Characterised by fluidity, and circular labor migration, between Syrians and Lebanese through the 1990s, it was largely overlooked by state actors until the Syrian conflict erupted in 2011. Indeed, no formal international boundary agreement exists between the two countries.
Much like the border with Syria, Lebanon’s southern border facilitated constant flows of people and commerce until 1949, when the emergence of the Palestinian Intifada led to border closure between Israel and Lebanon. War between Israel and its neighbors in 1948 and 1967, combined with intermittent Israeli occupations of Lebanon’s southern villages, subsequently hardened the border. Today, despite regular air and sea violations by Israeli forces, the border between Israel and Lebanon remains heavily militarised.
Both borders have been increasingly militarised and monitored by an assemblage of formal and informal security actors. Formal security is mandated to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the General Security. However, these vigilant bodies are not omnipresent in all border areas, particularly in the south, due to its association with armed groups strongholds for Hezbollah, among others. Alternatively, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) monitors the southern border with Israel, as they are mandated with assisting in Lebanese territorial control, as well as providing humanitarian aid.
Since the onset of the Syrian crisis, and the mass influx of refugees into Lebanon, financial and in-kind assistance, as well as expertise in monitoring Lebanese border flows, have been provided by various states and organisations, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, albeit without rigorous coordination. Security concerns regarding Lebanon’s borders surfaced in light of concerns regarding legal immigration, and residency.
Since Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 UN Geneva Convention, or its 1967 Protocol, the provision of temporary protection is favored over the recognition of formal refugee status. The 1962 Law of Entry, Stay, and Exit assigns legislative capacity concerning migration management to the security apparatus, i.e. the General Security. This fact, in tandem with ad hoc measures instigated by governmental bodies, in reaction to the arising refugee influx from Syrian, paved the way for a full-scale securitisation of migration and border governance in Lebanon.
Prior to the peak of the Syrian crisis, Lebanon had maintained an open-border policy, allowing Syrians to enter with ease, and legally remain for up to one year. In response to increasing attacks from Syria-based armed groups, coupled with the large influx of approximately one million Syrian refugees, the Lebanese Council of Ministers introduced new restrictive residency policies, in October 2014, with the aim of discouraging further inflows of refugees, and further increased the monitoring measures of those who stayed. These policies rendered legal residency in Lebanon nearly inaccessible for most refugees. This policy change provided Syrians with an ultimatum in terms of residency: (a) finding a Lebanese employer willing to sponsor them (i.e. a “kafeel”), or (b) registering with the UNHCR for aid, and signing a “pledge not to work”. As a result of these policies, 74% of Syrians, and up to 90% of Palestinians from Syria are estimated to be without legal status.
Indeed, the militarisation of Lebanon’s border policy impacts the lives of approximately 1.8 Syrians, around 250,000 Palestinians and countless Sri Lankan, Ethiopians, among others foreigners residing in Lebanon, also affecting their freedom of movement inside the country .
Today, Syrians attempting to cross the border legally are often left at the mercy of security forces who can detain or arrest individuals arbitrarily. Those unable to enter Lebanon through one of the official crossings can exit Syria legally, cross the 12-kilometer ‘no man’s land’ between the two countries, and attempt to cross the Lebanese border illegally, often with the assistance of smugglers. The journey can be fatal, exposing already vulnerable people to extreme weather, treacherous routes, and armed groups.
Similar border entry restrictions, movement within Lebanon is increasingly perilous for those without legal status. Refugees and migrants without legal status can be detained and deported through both criminal and administrative procedures, exposing them to dual penalisation. Checkpoints, throughout the country, subject all travelers to security inspections, thus increasing the risk of detention. Many have restricted their daily movement to their immediate dwellings and neighborhoods, in order to avoid detection, and attempt to conceal their nationality by adopting the Lebanese dialect.
Previously porous and dynamic, the internal and external borders of Lebanon have increasingly become securitised, used to control and dissuade refugee migration. Extending beyond entry and exit into the country, Lebanon’s border and migration policies restrict Syrians, Palestinians, and other populations, from achieving normalcy, and regularising their stay. Formulated and governed by an assemblage of actors, with a myriad of conflicting goals, border management in Lebanon leaves the country surrounded by simultaneously un-demarcated and severely monitored boundaries.